Questioning Promiscuity 1: An Exercise in Applied Ethics

¹ (A bit of preamble: Despite recognizing that feminists will likely see me as hopelessly obtuse, during this essay I will presume that a lifelong relationship is valid and continue in most cases to call it marriage even though feminists might prefer to amend the notion to a “partnership” (but to ensure completeness in another section I do get around to analyzing the compatibility of marriage and feminism). Also, when I use the term promiscuity, I mean to refer to the tendency to have multiple sexual partners and not intend to use it to denote a moral judgment.)

The effects of the sexual revolution are expansive —and not always desirable. Under the banner of liberation from oppression, attitudes towards sex have reformed beyond normalizing sex outside of marriage to abnormalizing abstinence. Far from advocating a reverse in the trend of promiscuity, I proffer a much weaker and individualistic thesis because of my perceived connection between promiscuity and a rising trend of divorce. It seems that the pluralistic approach towards sexual partners may not be as appropriate as advanced by popular culture. While typically a religious position (most notably advanced by Christianity), opposition to promiscuity does not need to come from theology for valuable support. Choosing a stance on moral issues does not require recourse into religion for justification, it may in fact evolve from purely amoral considerations. If promiscuity and divorce are directly connected as I propose, then someone who prefers a lifelong commitment to immediate gratification may rationally choose abstinence on these grounds.

Promiscuity does not necessarily increase the likelihood of divorce. While I am proposing a direct connection, I do not suppose that promiscuity is a necessary and sufficient cause for all failed relational commitments —obviously there are many cases where people engage in sexual activities with many different people and later have successful marriages. In the same vein, abstinence will not ensure success. While there may be a connection, this is also not a sufficient reason for choosing a side on the debate. Furthermore, there are also many other candidate causes for the same trend. For example, feminism’s undermining influence on the family unit might equally explain the phenomenon. However, rejecting feminism would be an inappropriate response; while feminists might seem to advocate the goodness of divorce since the ability is perceived as intrinsic for female liberty, the freedom itself is all that is necessary. Feminism does not entail that the act itself is good (or else feminists might seem to be arguing against relations altogether). Just to make sure I didn’t lose anyone in there, feminists can still have lifelong commitments (or at least their defense of divorce does not preclude it; there might be some who do not think a binding relationship is ever justified—equal or not). Presuming that an increased proportion of divorce is a side effect of freedom for women, the ability to divorce is justified as a necessary evil.

An alternative cause proposed to me is that there is that the mystique of marriage has been reduced and, subsequent to the decreased moral significance of ending such a contract, there is less security in it (Erin Bourne). This suggestion seems distinctly compatible with my thesis since the sexual revolution could easily be the cause of this reduced romanticization of marriage as well. However, (and from the same contributor) there could be a more powerful connection between liberty for women and causes of divorce; marriage as a form of securing inheritance claims and business transactions is certainly included in a complete account of history and when women’s rights movements removed this feature there was more freedom for women to end a undesirable union. As a result women also became more powerful in forming such a union. So, while people who actually liked each could get married for exactly that reason, it also introduced the modern notion that instead of a project marriage should always be congenial. It would seem a gross injustice to introduce the idea that we should “revert” to the notion that marriage can occur without some personal connection, but the notion of marriage as a project still seems valid. Since marriage is a permanent contract, it seems obvious that at some point people will disagree. But, since marriage is no longer perceived as permanent, there is a stronger appeal to separation —which is the feature my inquiry is attempting to diagnose.

This competing cause for the increase in divorce seems perfectly valid. But, it does not trump the effects of promiscuity I proposed. That women have the freedom to divorce should not entail that a marriage’s longevity is based solely on the continued mutual affection between the members. This attitude can certainly trace its roots back to women’s emancipation, but this does not mean that promiscuitous attitudes do not have a large effect (while feminism ensures the ability to divorce, it does not (at least inherently) provide grounds for it). Keeping in mind that this investigation is centered on appropriate solutions for augmenting the odds of successful marriage and (the idea from the previous section) that a permanent relationship is justified, if the attitudes of the partners themselves has the strongest effect on success then if premarital sex forms an attitude conducive to failure it seems that this effect is a valid concern.

Arranged marriages provide a supportive example, they are far more likely to be successful than the common western version —which is largely attributed to the fact that the people entering such a relationship know from the outset that it will be difficult. Since there is no guarantee that you will even like your partner, the presumption is that marriage is something you must work at; success is not presumed in the same way it is in western culture. Of course this does not mean we should run out and start arranging marriages. Since success in this instance is measured by the likelihood to not get divorced, this is a long ways from the western ideal of falling in love (which I presume everyone would like to maintain). The point is merely that cultural attitudes affect the chances of a partnership’s permanency.

I am assuming that someone interested in the original object of the investigation will not want to say that divorce is good. It seems that “looking into” a possible connection between promiscuity and divorce is likely motivated by a desire to have a successful –and permanent— relationship. The common view in favor of premarital sex includes the idea that sex is a necessary part of knowing someone fully; or rather necessary to guarantee compatibility—but this does not seem likely. When compared with a connection in moral values, life goals, personalities and general attitudes towards partnership the effects of a sexual encounter seem vanishingly small. While someone may object that although sex is less important it is nevertheless necessary, keep in mind that Christians have been abstaining from sex before marriage for a couple thousand years and yet have a very high success ratio. While sex is clearly not a necessary part of knowing someone, this by no means entails that no one should have sex before marriage.

Considered hedonistically –which should not carry any reprehensible connotations— there is still a powerful reason to have sex. It can clarify the issue immensely when the actual motivation is revealed but although the value of sex is mostly derived from the pleasure experience, this does not mean that the reason for having sex should be perceived as mere pleasure contrasted with the value of a successful marriage. In an analogous sense to my Christians and abstinence example, atheists, agnostics and people of disparate faiths have been having sex outside of marriage for just as long, yet “miraculously” they too can have successful marriages. Keeping in mind that this is an individualistic debate, the reasons for sex are context sensitive: you could have a very strong reason to have sex just because your partner desires it. The reasons themselves do not have to be objectively justified; the pleasure is as valid a concern as a possible effect on the longevity of marriage. The only objective conclusion we could possible draw from this debate is that a universal prescription on the subject is impossible.

However, certain conditions will provide a means of rationally investigating the value of either choice. For example, given his or her priorities a devout catholic should not even have cause to enter into the debate. Since catholic dogma asserts that everyone who wants to have sex should get married, the only valid consideration is whether the person considers sex or his or her faith to be most valuable. But, it is not always so clear; though all Christians may seem to have the same immediate answer, since the evangelical version of this faith is inherently individualistic such a Christian is supposed to have investigated the question (though arguable they most often don’t). For example, since being a feminist and a Christian is not incompatible, this may entail that “marriage” as traditionally defined is not justified (as explored in the previous section) –yet clearly a Christian can still have a relationship, and sex. But this may of course just be a semantic difference since “a lifelong commitment” will undoubtedly remain (“fooling around” however, is much more clearly—no). So although the answer for all Christians looks the same, committing to a choice without the appropriate explanation is unjustified. To sum up the argument: while it is sometimes easy to decide which is the strongest duty or preference, further inquiry is often required.

Since this is an exercise in applied ethics, it seems appropriate to respond to the objections people are likely to raise. Doubtless someone will respond that “you need to get laid,” and “quit worrying about it” — as if sex imbues some fundamental change in one’s psyche. As things now stand, that action already presumes a difference opinion since the object of this inquiry is the value vs. problems of sex itself; someone seriously contemplating the issue would already have to be different to just “get laid” without first resolving them. Consequently, a person presenting this objection must misunderstand the nature of the inquiry.

The fundamental worry I am pointing out is linked to the idea that promiscuity seems like practice for divorce. Although the level of physical intimacy is the same in premarital sex (unless someone wants object that you “do it” different when married (a notion proposed by Chris Rock)) when things get bad it is perfectly acceptable to leave. Instead of practicing intimacy it seems much more likely that people will get good at giving up when the difference between a close relationship with sex and an actual lifelong commitment is blurred. We earlier established that attitudes towards relationships are the most important and fundamental factors in a successful marriage; however, it seems that an attitude towards a relationship with sex and a life-term commitment is extremely difficult to distinguish because they both have a high level of intimacy. In fact it does not seem extremely controversial to suppose that a relationship with sex should have many similarities with marriage. Generally (though arguably not always) it is agreed that a “one night stand” approach to relationships is not as healthy as someone who forms deep connections. So it seems that we agree that there is something about sex that makes it more appropriate between somewhat connected people —but this is the same feature that makes a sexual relationship mimic aspects of marriage and, consequently, someone used to having sex with multiple partners less likely to have a good attitude towards a lifelong commitment (in case of confusion: attitude in this sense does not refer to someone’s feeling about the notion of marriage, it means their personality or, more directly, their experience).

So, surely we are not going to count someone’s experience with intimate commitments as something irrelevant to their aptitude for marriage? But then someone used to having intimate relations without commitment cannot be expected to suddenly change their personality when the relationship progresses past the usual point. It is not as though when the relationship becomes more serious their previous experience is immaterial. However, we can expect an objection along the lines that if someone only becomes sexually intimate in serious relationships, then they must be learning how to be intimate and serious. E.g. instead of “one night stands,” some people only connect physically with people they are committed to… But, this starts to look exactly like how marriage often works in our culture. It is perceived as a commitment –sure— but one that can be dissolved. It seems that marriage is just a natural progression in the post sexual-revolution version of relationships; it is more secure than just a boyfriend/girlfriend relationship, but not the “until death do us part” version of absolute security. But how can we expect absolute security from a process that from the beginning allows for the people to engage in the expression of extreme intimacy without commitment?

There are many other concerns that may be more relevant in a specific case, but the comment “there is no reason to deny the pleasure” is completely mislead. Just as clearly, there is no universal prescription that applies in favor of either alternative –sex or no sex is intrinsically subjective. However, contrary to the dominant attitude, the effects of physical intimacy on relationships are significant and worth of consideration. Prevalence does not instill any increased security in an opinion’s validity and this mass unity lends credence to my belief that the only form of truly individualistic expression that remains lies in morality.